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Consequences of Assessment: What is the Evidence?
William A. Mehrens
Michigan State University
Abstract Attention is here directed toward the prevalence of large scale assessments
(focusing primarily on state assessments). I examine the purposes of these assessment
programs; enumerate both potential dangers and benefits of such assessments;
investigate what the research evidence says about assessment consequences (including a
discussion of the quality of the evidence); discuss how to evaluate whether the
consequences are good or bad; present some ideas about what variables may influence
the probabilities for good or bad consequences; and present some tentative conclusions
about the whole issue of the consequences of assessment and the amount of evidence
available and needed.
I. INTRODUCTION
 It is a pleasure to address friends, colleagues, and associates on what I believe to
be an important topic -- what evidence do we have regarding the consequences of
assessment. I actually chose this topic at last year's (1997) convention when I attended a
symposium on consequential validity. As most of you probably know, I am not a fan of
the term "consequential validity." However, I am interested in the consequences of
assessment, and I hope all of you are also. Last year's symposium had such illustrious
speakers as Ross Green, Suzanne Lane, Bob Linn, Pam Moss, Mark Reckase, and
Elizabeth Taleporos. It was a great session. While they agreed on many things, I
perceived some differences in opinion about the amount, quality and interpretation of the
evidence regarding the consequences of assessment. I left that session believing that not
enough evidence was available but that it would be worthwhile to review the evidence
more thoroughly. Then, last summer (1997), at the Council of Chief State School
Officers Large Scale Assessment Conference, Peter Behuniak, Bob Linn, David Miller,
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and Gloria Turner presented evidence they had regarding the consequences of
assessment. While I was very impressed with their scholarship, I again was left feeling it
would be worthwhile to investigate the topic further. In addition to the fact that the
scholarly presentations mentioned above left me unsatisfied with respect to the evidence
on consequences, there are additional rationales for choosing this topic.
 Many, but certainly not all, political leaders at the national, state and local levels
have been touting the value of large scale assessment. For example, President Clinton
and Secretary of Education Riley have argued that voluntary national tests of reading at
grade four and mathematics at grade eight would have positive consequences for
education. Secretary Riley has said, "I believe these tests are absolutely essential for the
future of American education" (Riley, 1997a, quoted from Jones, 1997, p.3) (Note 2).
President Clinton has also asked each state to adopt tough standards for achievement.
The argument seems to be that if tough standards are adopted, achievement will rise.
 Educational reformers suggest that:
Assessments play a pivotal role in standards-led reform, by: communicating the
goals. ... providing targets..., and shaping the performance of educators and students.
Coupled with appropriate incentives and/or sanctions--external or
self-directed--assessments can motivate students to learn better, teachers to teach
better, and schools to be more educationally effective. (Linn and Herman, 1997, iii).
Note the word "can" in the above quotation. The question is, do they? Linn, Baker and
Dunbar (1991) pointed out that it cannot just be assumed that a more "authentic"
assessment will result in better classroom activities. Linn also correctly suggested that:
Evidence is also needed that the uses and interpretations are contributing to
enhanced student achievement and at the same time, not producing unintended
negative outcomes (1994, p. 8).
 There is no question that assessment is perceived by many as having a potential
for good in both the evaluation of the schools and, if believed necessary, the reforming
of them. But there are reasons to question whether that potential will be realized. As
Goodling has stated,
If testing is the answer to our educational problems, it would have solved them a
long time ago. American students are tested, tested, tested, and the Clinton
administration is proposing to test our children again (August 13, 1997).
Goodling suggested that thinking that new tests will lead to better students is "akin to
claiming that better speedometers make for faster cars." (quoted from Froomkin, 1997).
 There are both potential values and potential dangers in large scale testing. Is the
potential value of assessment a vision or an illusion? Are the potential dangers likely to
be realized? What is the evidence?
 For testing to be a good thing, the positive consequences must outweigh the
negative consequences -- by some factor greater than the costs. The costs of large scale
assessments are particularly high for alternative forms of assessment such as have been
used in Kentucky. Are the consequences of assessment worth the cost? Are the
consequences of alternative assessments worth the much greater cost? What is the
evidence?
General Overview
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 In this presentation I wish to spend a brief amount of time on the prevalence of
large scale assessments (focusing primarily on state assessments); discuss the purported
purposes of these assessment programs; enumerate some potential dangers and potential
benefits of such assessments; investigate what the research evidence says (and does not
say) about assessment consequences (including a discussion of the quality of the
evidence); discuss how to evaluate whether the consequences are good or bad; present
some ideas about what variables may influence the probabilities for good or bad
consequences; and present some tentative conclusions about the whole issue of the
consequences of assessment and the amount of evidence available and needed.
 Because the evidence is insufficient, my tentative conclusions about the
consequences of assessment will, at times, obviously and necessarily be based on less
than adequate evidence. It may seem drawing such conclusions runs counter to a general
value of educational researchers -- that inferences should be based on evidence. I am
firmly on the side that more evidence is needed and that inferences should be drawn
from such evidence. I am firmly against passing pure proselytizing off as if it is research
based. I am not opposed to drawing tentative conclusions from less than perfect data.
But crossing the line from basing inferences on evidence to basing inferences on a will
to believe should not be done surreptitiously, and I try hard to avoid that in this paper.
 For those of you who do not make it to the end, I will tell you now that the
conclusion will be that the evidence is reasonably scarce (at least insufficient), and
equivocal.
II. POPULARITY, PREVALENCE, PURPOSES AND FORMAT OF 
LARGE SCALE ASSESSMENT PROGRAMS
A. Popularity
 Large scale assessment programs are, at the abstract level, popular with politicians
and the public. This is true for both proposed and actual state level assessments and the
proposed national level "voluntary" assessments. One example of the popularity is
obtained from the 29th Gallup Poll. That poll showed that 57% of the public favor
President Clinton's proposed voluntary national test (Rose, et al., 1997). However, when
proposals get more specific, there can be opposition -- as witnessed by the opposition of
many groups after the proposed testing plan got more specific (e.g., with respect to what
languages the test would be administered in). It should be noted that front line educators
-- those that might be most informed about the potential value of the proposed voluntary
national test are far less favorable than the general public. Langdon (1997), reporting on
the PDK poll of teachers found that 69% are opposed to Clinton's proposal.
Measurement specialists might also have a reasonable claim to being more informed
than the politicians or the public. The comments that appeared on the Division D
listserve (http://aera.net/resource/) suggest that there are far more negative views among
listserve authors about the value of such tests than there are positive views.
B. Prevalence
 Regarding prevalence, state programs have been prevalent for at least fourteen
years. As early as 1984, Frank Womer stated that "clearly the action in testing and
assessment is in state departments of education" (Womer, 1984, p. 3). In identifying
reasons for this, Womer stated that:
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Lay persons and legislators who control education see testing- assessment as a
panacea for solving our concerns about excellence in education (Womer, 1984, p.3).
Anderson and Pipho reported that in 1984, 40 states were actively pursuing some form
of minimum competence testing (1984).
 Of course, it turned out that these minimum competency tests were not a
"panacea" for concerns about educational excellence, although there exists some debate
about whether they were, in general, a positive or negative force in education. In general,
there has been a change from testing what were called minimum competencies to testing
what we might now call world class standards. And, there has been a bit of a change in
how we assess -- with a movement away from sole reliance on multiple- choice tests to
the use of alternative forms of assessment. The most recent survey of trends in statewide
student assessment programs (Roeber, Bond, and Braskamp, 1997) reveals that 46 of the
50 states have some type of statewide assessment.
C. Purposes and stakes of state assessment programs
 The two most popular purposes for assessment according to respondents to a
survey of state assessment practices were the "improvement of instruction" -- which was
mentioned by 43 states, and "program evaluation" -- mentioned by 38 states. Some other
reported purposes (stated in order of number of states mentioning the purpose) include
school performance reporting (33), student diagnosis (27), high school exit requirement
(17), and school accreditation (11). (Roeber et al., 1997).
 However, measurement experts have suggested for some time that "tests used
primarily for curriculum advancement will look very different from those used for
accountability" (Anderson, 1985, p. 24) and they will have different intended and actual
impacts. Likewise, tests used for high stakes decisions (e.g. high school graduation and
merit pay) are likely to have different impacts than those used for low stakes decisions
(e.g. planning specific classroom interventions for individual students).
 It will not always be possible to keep purpose and stakes issues separated when
discussing consequences. However, when evidence (or conjecture) about consequences
applies to only a specific purpose or level of stakes I will try to make that clear.
D. Format questions
 A fairly hot issue in recent years is whether the format of the assessment should
vary depending on purposes and whether assessments using different formats have
different consequences. In the Roeber et al., (1997) survey of states, multiple choice
items were used by 41 states, extended response item types were used by 36, short
written response by 24, examples of student work by 10, and what was labeled as
performance assessments were used by 9 states. Four states used what were termed
projects.
 Performance assessment advocates have claimed that the format is important and
that positive consequences come from such a format and negative consequences come
from multiple-choice formats. Others, like me, are less sure of either of these positions.
As with purpose and stakes issues, it will not be possible to always keep these format
issues separated in this presentation, but attempts will be made.
 Because in recent years more positive claims have been made for "performance
assessments" many of the recent attempts to gather consequential evidence have been
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based on assessments that have used performance assessments. However, I tend to agree
with Haney and Madaus when they suggested "...what technology of assessment is used
probably makes far less difference than how it is used" (1989, p. 687).
III. EVIDENCE ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF ASSESSMENT
PROGRAMS
 Lane (1997) developed a comprehensive framework for evaluating the
consequences of assessment programs -- concentrating primarily on performance-based
assessments. She suggested that both the negative and positive consequences need to be
addressed and that one needs to consider both intended and plausible unintended
consequences.
 For purposes of this presentation, I will discuss some major potential benefits and
dangers as follows:
A. Curricular and instructional reform: Good, bad, or nonexistent?
B. Motivation/morale/stress/ethical behavior of teachers: Increase of decrease?
C. Motivation and self-concepts of students: Up or down?
D. True improvement in student learning, or just higher test scores?
E. Restore public confidence or provide data for critics?
 Evidence on consequences is somewhat sketchy, but the "Lansing State Journal"
did report one result in big headlines: "Test Results make School Chief Smile" (Mayes,
1997, p. 1) Many of you have seen such headlines in your own states. When scores go
up, the administrators are happy and act as if that means achievement has gone up. It
may have, but note well that the consequence I am reporting here (tongue in cheek) is
that the superintendent smiled -- not that achievement had improved!
 In general there is much more rhetoric than evidence about the consequences of
assessment and "too often policy debates emphasize only one side or the other of the
testing effects coin" (Madaus, 1991, p. 228). Baker et al., in an article on policy and
validity for performance based assessment reported that "less than 5% of the literature
cited empirical data." (1993, p. 1213). As they pointed out,
Most of the arguments in favor of performance-based assessment ... are based on
single instances, essentially hand-crafted exercises whose virtues are assumed
because they have been developed by teachers or because they are thought to model
good instructional practice. (Baker et al., 1993, p. 1211).
I would conclude, as Baker et al. did, that "a better research base is needed to evaluate
the degree to which newly developed assessments fulfill expectations" (1993, p. 1216).
Koretz suggested that:
Despite the long history of assessment-based accountability, hard evidence about its
effects is surprising sparse, and the little evidence that is available is not
encouraging. ...The large positive effects assumed by advocates...are often not
substantiated by hard evidence.... (Koretz, 1996, p. 172.).
 Reckase (1997) pointed out one of the logical problems in obtaining evidence on
the consequences of assessments. The definition of a consequence implies a cause and
effect relationship, but most of the evidence has not been gathered in a manner that
permits a scholar (or anyone else with common sense) to draw a causative inference.
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 Green (1997) mentioned many problems in doing research on the consequences of
assessment. Among them are that few school systems will welcome reports of
unanticipated negative consequences, so cooperation may be hard to obtain; there will be
disagreements about the appropriate criterion measures of the consequences;
cause-effect conclusions will be disputed; and much of the research undertaken is likely
to be undertaken by those trying to prove that what exists is inferior to their new and
better idea.
 Much of the research has been based on survey information from teachers and
principals and, as many authors have pointed out, classroom observations might be more
compelling information (see, for example, Linn, 1993 and Pomplun, 1997). Research by
McDonnell and Choisser (1997) employed three data sources: face to face interviews,
telephone interviews, and assignments collected from the teachers along with a one-
page log for each day in a two week period. As the authors pointed out, instructional
artifacts is a relatively new strategy --not likely as good as classroom observations, but
not as expensive either.
 Although evidence is sketchy, there is some! I will discuss such evidence under
the headings given earlier regarding the possible dangers and potential benefits of
assessment programs.
A. Curricular and instructional reform: Good, bad or nonexistent?
 Curricular and instructional reform typically means changing the content of the
curriculum or the process of instruction. Not quite fitting either of those categories is
changing the length of the school day or the school year. Pipho (1997) has reported that
one change between the first and second year of state assessments in Minnesota was the
addition of summer school offerings, Saturday classes, and after- school remedial
programs. That kind of "reform" is mentioned at other places in the literature, and is, at
least arguably, a valuable consequence.
 With respect to the more traditional meanings of curricular and instructional
reform, it has been commonly assumed that assessments (at least high stakes
assessments) will influence curriculum and instruction. One often hears the mantra that
"WHAT YOU TEST IS WHAT YOU GET." Taleporos stated flatly at last year's AERA
session that "we all know that how you test is how it gets taught." (Taleporos, 1997, p.
1). Actually, the evidence for a test's influence on either curricular content or
instructional process is not totally clear. And it will vary by the stakes. Porter, Floden,
Freeman, Schmidt, and Schwille reported more than ten years ago that:
Another myth exposed as being only a half truth is that teachers teach topics that are
tested. Little evidence exists to support the supposition that national
norm-referenced, standardized tests administered once a year have any important
influence on teachers' content decisions. (Porter, et al., 1986, p. 11).
 But the "myth" persists. Is it a half truth, a full truth, or just wrong? Logic
suggests it may depend on stakes, rigor of the standards, and just what the content is
(Airasian, 1988). Some anecdotal evidence also supports the importance of stakes. For
example, Floden (personal communication, 1998) states that while in the Content
Determinants work (the Porter et al. study just cited) few teachers paid attention to the
tests, he is now working in districts where losing accreditation is a real threat, so
teachers are busy aligning curriculum to the Michigan Educational Assessment Program
(MEAP) and setting aside time before the test for MEAP-specific work.
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1. Impact of multiple-choice minimum competency tests on curriculum
and instruction
 Minimum competency tests were not primarily designed to "reform"
the curriculum. Rather, they supposedly measured what schools were
already teaching. The tests were intended to find out whether students had
learned that material and, if not, to serve as motivators for both the students
and the educators. The intended curricular/instructional effect was to
concentrate more on the instruction of what was considered to be very
important educational goals.
 Some earlier writings on the impact of multiple-choice tests
suggested that the tests resulted in teachers narrowing the curriculum and
corrupting teaching because teachers turned to simply passing out
multiple-choice question work sheets. The critics argued that education was
harmed due to the narrowing of the curriculum and the teaching and testing
for only low level facts.
 Aside from the confusion of test format with test content (true
measurement experts realize that multiple choice tests are not limited to
testing facts), there is insufficient evidence to allow any firm conclusion
that such tests have had harmful effects on curriculum and instruction. In
fact, there is some evidence to the contrary. Kuhs, Porter, Floden, Freeman,
Schmidt, and Schwille (1985) reported that:
the teachers' topic selection did not seem to be much influenced by the
state minimum competencies test or the district-used standardized tests
(Kuhs, et al., 1985, p. 151).
There is no evidence of which I am aware showing that fewer high level
math courses are taught (or taught to fewer students) in states where
students must pass a low level math test in order to receive a high school
diploma.
 There are a few studies (quoted over and over again) which
presumably show that elementary teachers align instruction with the content
of basic skills tests (e.g. Madaus, West, Harmon, Lomax and Viator, 1992;
Shepard, 1991). And I believe those studies have some validity. It is hard to
believe that tests with some stakes connected to them will not have some
influence on curriculum and instruction. For example, Smith and
Rottenberg (1991) reported on "an extensive research study." "The
consequences of external testing were inferred from an analysis of the
meanings held by participants and direct observation of testing activities..."
(p. 7). They concluded, among other things that (1) external testing reduces
the time available for ordinary instruction, (2) testing affects what
elementary schools teach -- in high stakes environments, schools neglect
material that external tests exclude, (3) external testing encourages use of
instructional methods that resemble tests, and (4) "as teachers take more
time for test preparation and align instruction more closely with content and
format, they diminish the range of instructional goals and activities" (1991,
p. 11).
 Thus, there are studies suggesting that multiple-choice tests result in a
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narrowing of the curriculum and more drill work in teaching. But, in fact,
the studies are few in number and critics of traditional basic skills testing
accept the studies somewhat uncritically. In my opinion, the evidence is not
as strong as the rhetoric of those reporting the research would suggest and
there is some research evidence that teachers do not choose topics based on
the test content (Kuhs et al., 1985).
 Green (1997) discussed the evidence and questioned the conclusion
that multiple choice tests are harmful stating that "I believe that the data just
cited opens to question the assertions about the evils of multiple-choice
tests." (Green, 1997, p. 4).
2. Impact of performance assessments on curriculum and instruction
 Much of the recent research and rhetoric has been concerned with the
effects of performance assessments. Performance assessments are popular in
part just because of their supposed positive influence on curricular and
instructional reform. Advocates of performance assessment treat as an
established fact the position that teaching to traditional standardized tests
has "resulted in a distortion of the curriculum for many students, narrowing
it to basic, low-level skills" (Herman, Klein, Heath, and Wakai, 1994, p. 1).
Further, professional educators have been pushing for curricular reform,
suggesting that previous curricula were inadequate and, generally, focused
too much on the basics. The new assessments should be more rigorous and
schools should be held responsible for these more rigorous standards. As a
SouthEastern Regional Vision for Education (SERVE) document entitled
"A new framework for state accountability systems" (September 8, 1994)
pointed out, some legislative initiatives
ignored a basic reality: Those schools that had failed to meet older, less
rigorous standards were no more able to meet higher standards when
the accountability bar was raised. As a result, state after state is
confronted with previously failing schools failing the new systems
(SERVE, 1994, p. 2).
 What does the research tell us about the curricular and instructional
effects of performance assessments? Khattri, Kane, and Reeve visited
sixteen schools across the United States that were developing and
implementing performance assessments. They interviewed school
personnel, students, parents and school board members; collected student
work; and conducted observations. They concluded that:
In general, our findings show that the effect of assessments on the
curriculum teachers use in their classrooms has been marginal,
although the impact on instruction and on teacher roles in some cases 
has been substantial (Khattri, Kane, and Reeve, 1995, p. 80).
 Chudowsky and Behuniak (1997) used teacher focus groups from
seven schools representing a cross section of schools in Connecticut. These
focus groups discussed their perceptions of the impact of the Connecticut
Academic Performance Test -- an assessment that uses multiple-choice,
grid-in, short answer and extended response items. Teachers in all but one
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of the schools reported that preparing students and aligning their instruction
to the test "resulted in a narrowing of the curriculum" (Chudowsky and
Behuniak, 1997, p. 8). Regarding instructional changes, "teachers most
frequently reported having students 'practice' for the test on CAPT sample
items" (p. 6). However the schools also reported using strategies "to move
beyond direct test preparation into instructional approaches" (p. 6). Teachers
also
consistently reported that the most negative impact of the test is that it
detracts significantly from instructional time. Teachers at all of the
schools complained vehemently about the amount of instructional time
lost to administer the test (p. 7).
 Koretz, Mitchell, Barron, and Keith (1996) surveyed teachers and
principals in two of the three grades in which the Maryland School
Performance Assessment Program (MSPAP) is administered. As they 
reported, the MSPAP program "is designed to induce fundamental changes
in instruction" (p. vii). While about three-fourths of the principals and half
of the teachers expressed general support for MSPAP, fifteen percent of the
principals and 35% of the teachers expressed opposition. One interesting
finding was that about 40% of fifth-grade teachers "strongly agreed that
MSPAP includes developmentally inappropriate tasks" (p. viii). One of the
summary statements made by Koretz Mitchell, Barron, and Keith (1996) is
as follows:
The results reported here suggest that the program has met one of its
goals in increasing the amount of writing students do in school. At the
same time, teachers' responses suggest the possibility that this change
may have negative ramifications as well, in terms of both instructional
impact and test validity. Many teachers maintain that the emphasis on
writing is excessive and that instruction has suffered because of the
amount of time required for writing. ...[also,] emphasis on writing
makes it difficult to judge math competence of some students" (Koretz,
Mitchell, Barron, and Keith, 1996, p. xiii).
 Rafferty (1993) surveyed urban teachers and staff regarding the
MSPAP program. Individuals were asked to respond in Likert fashion to
several statements. When the question was "MSPAP will have little effect
on classroom practices" 33% agreed or strongly agreed, 24% were
uncertain, 42% disagreed or strongly disagreed and 1% did not respond. To
the statement "classroom practices are better because of MSPAP" 21% were
in agreement, 36% were uncertain, 41% disagreed, and 2% did not answer.
To the statement "MSPAP is essentially worthwhile," 24% agreed or
strongly agreed, 25% were uncertain, and 48% disagreed or strongly
disagreed (3% did not respond). Perhaps a reasonable interpretation of these
data is that MSPAP will likely have an impact, but not necessarily a good
one.
 Koretz, Barron, Mitchell, and Stecher (1996) did a study for
Kentucky similar to the one done by Koretz, Mitchell, Barron, and Keith in
Maryland. They surveyed the teachers and principals in Kentucky regarding
the Kentucky Instructional Results Information System (KIRIS) and found
much the same thing as had been found in Maryland. Among other findings,
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were the following (Note 3) :
--90% of the teachers agreed that portfolios made it difficult to
cover the regular curriculum (p. 37); --most teachers agreed that
imposing rewards and sanctions causes teachers to ignore
important aspects of the curriculum (p. 42); --portfolios were
cited as having negative effects on instruction almost as often
as having had positive effects (p. xi); --almost 90% of the
teachers agreed that KIRIS caused them to de- emphasize or
neglect untested material (p. xiii); and --other aspects of
instruction have suffered as a result of time spent on writing,
and emphasis on writing makes it difficult to judge the
mathematical competence of some students (p. xv).
 McDonnell and Choisser (1997) studied the local implementation of
new state assessments in Kentucky and North Carolina. They concluded that
Instruction by teachers in the study sample is reasonably consistent
with the state assessment goals at the level of classroom activities, but
not in terms of the conceptual understandings the assessments are
measuring. Teachers have added new instructional strategies ... but ...
they have not fundamentally changed the depth and sophistication of
the content they are teaching. (1997, p. ix.).
 Stretcher and Mitchell (1996) reported on the effects of
portfolio-driven reform in Vermont and stated that
The Vermont portfolio assessment program has had substantial
positive effects on fourth-grade teachers' perceptions and practices in
mathematics. Vermont teachers report that the program has taught
them a great deal about mathematical problem solving and that they
have changed their instructional practices in important ways (Stretcher
and Mitchell, 1996, p. ix).
  Smith, Nobel, Heinecke, Seck, Parish, Cabay, Junker, Haag, Tayler,
Safran, Penley, and Bradshaw (1997) conducted a study of the
consequences of the, now discarded, Arizona Student Assessment Program
(ASAP). Although the program had several parts including some norm
referenced testing with the Iowa tests, the most visible portion of ASAP was
the performance assessment. Teacher opinion of the direction of the effect
of ASAP on the curriculum was divided.
Some defined 'ASAP' as representing an unfortunate and even
dangerous de-emphasis of foundational skills, whereas others
welcomed the change or saw the new emphasis as encompassing both
skills and problem solving. (Smith et al., 1997, p. 40).
 Some interesting quotes by teachers found in the Smith et al. report
are as follows:
Nobody cares about basics...The young teachers coming out of college
will just perpetuate the problem since they are learning whole language
instruction and student-centered classroom. Certainly these concepts
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have their merits, but not at the expense of basics on which education
is based (p. 41).
The ASAP ... is designed to do away with 'skills' because kids today
don't relate to skills, because they are boring. By pandering to this we
are weakening our society, not strengthening it. It is wrong! I was told
by a state official that teachers would be more like coaches under
ASAP. Ask any coach if they teach skills in isolation before they
integrate it into their game plan. They will all tell you yes. I rest my
case. (Smith et al., 1997, p. 41).
 As Smith, et al. report, about two thirds of the teachers believed that
"pupils at this school need to master basic skills before they can progress to
higher order thinking and problem solving" (1997, p. 41). Forty three
percent of the teachers believed that "ASAP takes away from instructional
time we should be spending on something more important." (p. 44). In spite
of many teachers being unhappy with the content of ASAP, "about 40% of
the teachers reported that district scope and sequences had been aligned
with ASAP." (p. 46). As the authors report, "changes consequent to ASAP
seemed to fall into a typology that we characterized as 'coherent action,'
'compliance only,' 'compromise,' and 'drag.'" (p. 46).
 Miller (1998) studied the effect of state mandated performance based
assessments on teachers' attitudes and practices in six different contexts
(grade level and content areas). Two questions were asked relevant to
curricular and instructional impacts.
"I have made specific efforts to align instruction with the state
assessments." (Percents who agreed or strongly agreed ranged from
54.5 to 92.7% across the six contexts.) "I feel that state mandatory
assessments have had a negative impact by excessively narrowing the
curriculum covered in the classroom." (Percents who agreed or
strongly agreed ranged from 28.7 to 46.8%. Only teachers in five of the
contexts responded to that question.)
 The two questions provide interesting results. While the majority
made specific efforts to align instruction, the majority did not feel it resulted
in excessively narrowing of the curriculum. However, as Miller pointed out,
"the assessments were usually intended to give supplemental information.
Consequently, they do not reflect everything that students learn, and only
provide a small view of student performance..." (Miller, 1998, pp. 5-6). To
align instruction to assessments that provide only a small view of student
performance without excessively narrowing the curriculum would seem to
be a difficult balancing act.
 While more research and opinions could be reviewed, a reasonably
summary is that if stakes are high enough and if content is deemed
appropriate enough by teachers, there is likely to be a shift in the curriculum
and instruction to the content sampled by the test (or the content on the test
if the test is not secure). If stakes are low, and/or if teachers believe the
assessment is testing developmentally inappropriate materials and/or
teaching to the assessment would reduce the amount of time the teachers
wish to spend on other -- what they consider more important -- content, the
impact is not so obvious.
12 of 30
B. Motivation/morale/stress/ethical behavior of teachers: Increase or
Decrease?
 Many would argue, quite reasonably, that if we are to improve education, we must
depend on the front line educators -- the teachers -- to lead the charge. Do large scale
assessments tend to improve the efforts, attitudes and ethical behavior of teachers?
 Smith and Rottenberg suggested that external tests negatively affect teachers. As
they wrote:
the chagrin they felt comes from their well-justified belief that audiences external to
the school lack interpretive context and attribute low scores to lazy teachers and
weak programs (Smith and Rottenberg, 1991, p. 10).
 Although I believe they were primarily discussing the effects of traditional
assessments, one should expect the same reaction from performance assessments.
Audiences external to the school are no more able to infer correct causes of low scores
on performance assessments than they are to infer correct causes of low scores on
multiple-choice assessments. The inference to lazy teachers and weak programs is
equally likely no matter what the test format or test content.
 Koretz, Mitchell, Barron and Keith (1996) reported that for the Maryland School
Performance Assessment Program (MSPAP):
Few teachers reported that morale is high, and a majority reported that MSPAP has
harmed it. ... 57% of teachers responded that MSPAP has led to a decrease in teacher
morale in their school, while only a few (4%) reported that MSPAP has produced an
increase (Koretz, Mitchell, Barron and Keith, 1996, p. 24).
 Koretz, Barron, Mitchell and Stecher (1996) in the Kentucky study reported that
"about 3/4 of teachers reported that teachers' morale has declined as a result of KIRIS"
(p. x). Stecklow (1997) reported that there were conflicts in over 40% of Kentucky
schools about how to divide up the reward money. So affect was not necessarily high
even in the schools that got the rewards! Koretz, Barron, Mitchell and Stecher (1996)
also found that principals reported that KIRIS had affected attrition. But the attrition was
for both good and poor teachers.
 With respect to effort, at least the teachers in Kentucky reported that their efforts
to improve instruction and learning had increased (Koretz, Barron, Mitchell and Stecher,
1996, p. 23). But at some point, increased efforts lead to burnout -- and thus attrition
increases.
 It is commonly believed that some teachers engage in behaviors of questionable
ethics when teaching toward, administering and scoring high stakes multiple-choice
tests. What about performance assessments? Koretz, Barron, Mitchell and Stecher
(1996) reported that in Kentucky
Appreciable minorities of teachers reported questionable test- administration
practices in their schools. About one-third reported that questions are at least
occasionally rephrased during testing time, and roughly one in five reported that
questions about content are answered during testing, that revisions are recommended
during or after testing, or that hints are provided on correct answers. (Koretz, Barron,
Mitchell and Stecher, 1996, p. xiii).
 In summary, the evidence regarding the effects of large scale assessments on
teacher motivation, morale, stress and ethical behavior is sketchy. But what evidence
13 of 30
there is, coupled with what seems logical, suggests that increasing the stakes for teachers
will increase efforts, lead to more burnout, decrease morale, and increase the probability
of unethical behavior.
C. Motivation and self-concepts of students: Up or down?
 With respect to assessment impacts on the affect of students, we are again in a
subarea where there is not a great deal of empirical evidence. Logic suggests that the
impact on students may be quite different for those tests where the stakes apply to them
than for tests where the stakes impact the teachers. Impact surely depends on whose ox
is getting gored by the stakes.
 Also, the impact should depend on how high the standards are. It is reasonably to
believe that the impact of minimal competency tests would be minimal for the large
majority of students for whom such tests would not present a challenge. However, for
those students who had trouble getting over such a minimal hurdle, the tests probably
would both increase motivation and increase frustration and stress -- the exact mix
varying on the personality characteristics of the students.
 Smith and Rottenberg found that for younger students teachers believed that 
standardized tests
cause stress, frustration, burnout, fatigue, physical illness, misbehavior and fighting,
and psychological distress (Smith and Rottenberg, 1991, p. 10).
That belief of teachers may be true, but certainly does not constitute hard evidence. I
come closer to Ebel's view when he suggested that
Of the many challenges to a child's peace of mind caused by such things as angry
parents, playground bullies, bad dogs, shots from the doctor, and things that go bump
in the night, standardized tests must surely be among the least fearsome for most
children (Ebel, 1976, p. 5).
 Lane and Parke (1996), reporting on the consequences of a math performance
assessment found that some students developed feelings of inadequacy and, as a result,
were less motivated. Miller (1998) found that the percent of teachers responding
positively to the statement that performance assessments "increased student confidence"
ranged from only 9.1 to 37.6% across five different contexts.
 However, Kane et al. (1997) employing a qualitative, case-study methodology and
visiting 16 schools ("not confirmed to be representative" --p. xvi) developing and
implementing performance assessments reported that
many interviewees reported that students exhibit a greater motivation to learn and a
greater amount of engagement with performance tasks and portfolio assignments
than with other types of assignments" (Kane et al., 1997, p. 201).
 Koretz, Barron, Mitchell and Stecher (1996) reported that in Kentucky one third
of the teachers reported that students' morale had deteriorated and virtually none
reported an increase in student morale. They also reported that an emphasis or writing
caused students to become tired of writing.
 As mentioned earlier, one of the factors effecting student affect is how high the
standards are set. Minimum standards are not likely to have a major impact. High
standards might. Linn (1994) has pointed out that
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The dual goals of setting performance standards for student certification that are both
'world class' and apply to 'all' students are laudable, but it cannot simply be assumed
that only positive effects will result from this press (Linn, 1994, p. 8).
Linn quoted Coffman as follows:
Holding common standards for all pupils can only encourage a narrowing of
educational experiences for most pupils, doom many to failure, and limit the
development of many worthy talents (Coffman, 1993, p. 8; quoted from Linn, 1994).
We are simply putting too many students and too many teachers under too much
pressure if we hold unrealistically high standards for all students. As Bracey has said, in
an article entitled "Variance Happens -- get over it!"
We are currently in a period that adheres rabidly to an all- children-can-learn
philosophy. ... The stance is a philosophical, moral -- almost religious -- posture
taken by a wide spectrum of educators and psychologists who ought to know better.
... By telling everyone that all children can learn, we set the stage for the next great
round of educational failure when it is revealed that not everyone has learned, in 
spite of our sincere beliefs and improved practices. (Bracey, 1995, p. 22 and 26).
 Of course his point is not that some children can not learn anything, but that not
everyone can achieve at high standards in academics anymore than everyone can become
athletically proficient enough in every sport to play on the varsity teams.
D. True improvement in student learning, or just higher test scores?
In mandating tests, policy makers have created the illusion that test performance is
synonymous with the quality of education (Madaus, 1985, p. 617).
 All of us recognize that it is possible for test scores to go up without an increase in
student learning on the domain the test supposedly samples. This occurs, for example,
when teachers teach the questions on non-secure tests. Teaching too closely to the
assessment results in the inferences from the test scores being corrupted. One can no
longer make inferences from the test to the domain. The Lake Wobegon effect results.
Many of us have written about that (e.g. Mehrens and Kaminski, 1989).
 If the assessment questions are secure and the domain the test samples is made
public, corrupting reasonable inferences from the scores is more difficult. If the
inference from rising test scores of secure tests is that students have learned more of the
domain the test samples, that is likely a correct inference. However, those making
inferences may not realize how narrow the domain is, or that a test sampling a similar
sounding but somewhat differently defined domain might give different results. Of
course, if the inference from rising scores is that educational quality has gone up, that
may not be true.
1. Improvement on traditional tests
Pipho has reported that:
Ironically, every state that has initiated a high school graduation test in
grade 8 or 9 has reported an initial failure rate of approximately 30%.
By 12th grade, using remediation and sometimes twice-a-year retests,
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this failure rate always gets down to well under 5% (Pipho, 1997, p.
673).
 Is this true improvement, or is it a result of teaching to the test? Recall
that these tests are supposedly secure so one cannot teach the specific
questions. However, one could limit instruction to the general domain the
tests sample. My interpretation is that the increase in scores represents a true
improvement on the domain the test samples, but that it does not necessarily
follow that it is a true improvement in the students' education.
2. Improvement on performance assessments
 What about performance assessments? Do increases in scores indicate
necessary improvement in the domain, or an increase in educational quality?
Certainly no more so than for multiple-choice assessments, and perhaps less
so. Even if specific tasks are "secure," performance assessments are
generally thought to be even more "memorable" and reusing such
assessments can result in corrupted inferences. If the inference is to only the
specific task, there may not be too much corruption, but any inferences to a
domain the task represents or to the general quality of education are as
likely to be incorrect for performance assessments as for multiple-choice
assessments.
 Shepard, Flexer, Hiebert, Marion, Mayfield, and Weston (1996)
conducted a study investigating the effects of classroom performance
assessments on student learning. As they stated:
Overall, the predominant finding is one of no-difference or no gains in
student learning following from the year-long effort to introduce
classroom performance assessments. Although we argue subsequently
that the small year-to-year gain in mathematics is real and interpretable
based on qualitative analysis, honest discussion of project effects must 
acknowledge that any benefits are small and ephemeral (Shepard et 
al., 1996, p. 12, emphasis added).
 Others, doing less rigorously controlled studies based on teacher
opinion surveys, have been equally cautious in their statements. Khattri et
al. (1995), in their study visiting 16 schools stated that
Only a few teachers said performance-based teaching and assessment
helped students learn more and develop a fuller multi-disciplinary
understanding (Khattri et al., 1995, p. 82).
 Koretz, Barron, Mitchell and Stecher (1996) reported that
Few teachers expressed confidence that their own schools' increases on
KIRIS were largely the results of improved learning (Koretz, Barron,
Mitchell and Stecher, 1996, p. xiii)
The authors go on to suggest that
A variety of the findings reported here point to the possibility of
inflated gains on KIRIS--that is, the possibility that scores have
increased substantially more than mastery of the domains that the
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assessment is intended to represent (Koretz, Barron, Mitchell and
Stecher, 1996, p. xv).
Kane et al. (1997) concluded from their study that
In the final analysis, the success of assessment reform as a tool to
enhance student achievement remains to be rigorously demonstrated
(Kane et al., 1997, p. 217).
 Miller (1998) asked teachers whether they believed the state
mandated performance assessments "have had a positive effect on student
learning." Percents across five contexts ranged from 11.3% to 54.7%. When
asked whether the tests results were "an accurate reflection of student
performance" the percentages ranged from 13.1% to 28.7%.
 Finally, for some types of portfolio assessments, one does not even
know who did the work. As Gearhart, Herman, Baker, and Whittaker
pointed out: "This study raises questions concerning validity of inferences
about student competence based on portfolio work." (Gearhart et al., 1993,
p. 1).
3. Conclusions about increases
 In conclusion, there is considerable evidence that students' pass rates
increase on secure high-stakes (mostly multiple-choice) graduation tests.
There is at least some reason to believe that students have increased their
achievement levels on the specific domains the secure tests are measuring.
(Of course, if supposedly secure tests are not actually secure the inference
that increased scores indicate increased achievement could be incorrect.)
There is less evidence about increases in scores for performance
assessments. While it is true that some states (e.g. Kentucky) have shown
remarkable gains in scores, evidence points to the possibility that the gains
are inflated and there is generally less confidence that achievement in the
represented domain has also increased. In neither case can we necessarily
infer that quality of education has increased. That inference cannot flow
directly from the data. Rather, it must be based on a philosophy of education
that says an increase in the domain tested represents an increase in the
quality of education. As Madaus stated, it is an illusion to believe at an
abstract level that test performance is synonymous with quality of education.
Nevertheless, test performance can inform us about the quality of education
-- at least about the quality of education on the domain being assessed.
E. Restore public confidence or provide data for critics?
 At an abstract level, it seems philosophically wrong and politically shortsighted
for educators to argue against the gathering of student achievement data for accounting
and accountability purposes. My own belief is that an earlier stance of the NEA against
standardized tests resulted in the public wondering just what it was the educators were
trying to hide. I suspect the NEA stance contributed to the action in the state departments
that Womer mentioned in 1984. Certainly the public has a right to know something
about the quality of the schools they pay for and the level of achievement their children
are reaching in those schools.
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 Some educators strongly believe -- with some supporting evidence -- that the press
has incorrectly maligned the public schools (e.g. Bracey, 1996, and Berliner and Biddle,
1995). While their views have not gone unchallenged (see Stedman, 1996) it does seem
true that bad news about education travels faster than good news about education. Will
the data from large scale assessments change the public's views?
 The answer to the above question depends, in part, upon whether the scores go up,
go down, or stay the same. It also depends upon whether the public thinks we are
measuring anything worthwhile. And it also depends upon how successful we are at
communicating the data and communicating what reasonable inferences can be drawn
from the data.
 Scores generally have been going up in Kentucky, but it has not resulted in all the
press highlighting the great job educators are doing in Kentucky. For example Stecklow
(1997), in writing about the Kentucky approach suggests:
It has spawned lawsuits, infighting between teachers and staff, anger among parents,
widespread grade inflation -- and numerous instances of cheating by teachers to
boost student scores. (Stecklow, 1997, p. 1).
A conclusion of the evaluation done of KIRIS by The Evaluation Center of Western
Michigan University stated that
...all the cited evidence suggests stakeholders have questions concerning the
legitimacy, validity, reliability, and fairness of the KIRIS assessment. We have no
evidence to suggest that parents think the assessment component of KIRIS is a fair,
reliable, and valid system (The Evaluation Center, 1995, p. 20).
 The Stecklow quote is not a ringing endorsement of the program or the quality of
education in Kentucky. The Evaluation Center quote is not a ringing endorsement of the
quality of the data in the assessment. But, in general, the public is happier with high
scores than they are with low scores -- often considering which district to live in based
on published test scores. (The public may be making two quite different inferences from
these scores. One, probably an incorrect inference, is that the district with the higher
scores has better teachers or a better curriculum. A second, correct inference is that if
their children attend the district with the higher scores they will be more likely to be in
classes with a higher proportion of academically able fellow students.)
 There is currently considerable concern about whether the newer "reform"
assessments cover the correct content. Reform educators were not happy with minimum
competency tests covering basics; but the public is not happy with what they perceive to
be a departure from teaching and testing the basics. Baker, Linn, and Herman (1996) talk
about the crisis of credibility that performance assessments suffer based on a large gap
between the views of educational reformers and segments of the public. McDonnell
(1997) stated that
...the political dimensions of assessment policy are typically overlooked. Yet because
of their link to state curriculum standards, these assessments often embody
unresolved value conflicts about what content should be taught and tested, and who
should define that content. (McDonnell, 1997, p. v).
As McDonnell pointed out, there are fundamental differences between what educational
reformers and large segments of the public believe should be in the curriculum.
The available opinion data strongly suggest that the larger public is skeptical of new
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curricular approaches in reading, writing, and mathematics (McDonnell, 1997, p.
67).
The truth of this can be seen by the fight over the mathematics standards in California.
 The press and public seem either reasonably unimpressed by the data educators
provide and/or make incorrect inferences from it. What can change that? We need to
gather high quality data over important content and communicate the data to the public
in ways that encourage correct inferences about students' levels of achievement. We
need to be especially careful to discourage the public from making causative inferences
if they are not supported by the research data.
IV. ARE THE CONSEQUENCES GOOD OR BAD?
 It should be obvious by now that I do not believe we have a sufficient quantity of
research on the consequences of assessment. Further, the evidence we do have is
certainly not of the type from which we can draw causative inferences, which seems to
be what the public wants to do. Given the evidence we do have, can we decide if it
suggests the consequences of assessment are positive or negative? If the evidence were
better, could we decide if the consequences are positive or negative? I maintain that each
of us can decide, but we may well disagree. Interpreting the consequences as being good
or bad is related to differences in convictions about the proper goals of education. Let us
look at the evidence regarding each of the five potential benefits and/or dangers with
respect to the quality of the consequences.
A. Curricular and Instructional Reform
 While there is no proven cause and effect relationship between assessment and the
curriculum content or instructional strategies there is some evidence and compelling
logic to suggest that high stakes assessments can influence both curriculum and
instruction. Is this good or bad? It is a matter of one's goals. Reform educators were
dismayed to think that minimum competency tests using multiple-choice questions were
influencing curriculum and instruction. They pushed for performance assessments, not
because they abhorred tests influencing curriculum and instruction, but because they
wanted the tests to have a different influence.
 The public was not dismayed that educators tested the basics -- they rather
approved. They believe (some evidence suggests incorrectly) that educators have moved
away from basics and are dismayed. Obviously the narrowing and refocusing of the
curriculum and instructional strategies are viewed as either negative or positive
depending upon whether the narrowing and refocusing are perceived to be toward
important content. Educators and the public do not necessarily agree about this.
B. Increasing Teacher Motivation and Stress
 Increasing teacher stress may be perceived as good or bad -- depending on
whether one believes teachers are lazy and need to be slapped into shape or whether one
believes (as I do) that teachers already suffer from too much job stress.
C. Changing Students' Motivation or Self Concept
 We might all favor an increase in student motivation. I, for one, do not believe a
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major problem in education in the United States is that students are trying too hard to
learn too much. But some educators do worry about the stress that tests cause students
(recall the quote from Smith and Rottenberg). There is such a thing as "test anxiety"
(more accurately called evaluation anxiety), but many would argue that occasional state
anxiety is a useful experience -- perhaps helping individuals to learn how to cope with
anxiety and to treat stress as eustress rather than distress.
 But what if assessment lowers students' self concepts? Again, this could be either
good or bad -- depending on whether one believes students should have a realistic view
of how inadequate their knowledge and skills are. (Recall that in Japan, whose students
outperform U.S. students, the students do not feel as confident in their math
competencies as do U.S. students.) As one colleague has pointed out to me, we are not
necessarily doing students a favor by allowing them to perceive themselves as competent
in a subject matter if that, indeed, is not the truth (Ryan, personal communication, 1997).
D. Increased Scores on Assessments
 Surely this is good -- right? It again depends. It depends on whether the gains
reflect improvement on the total domain being assessed or just increases in scores,
whether we care about the tested domain, and whether, as a result of the more focused
instruction, other important domains (not being tested) suffer.
E. Public Awareness of Student Achievement
 Is public awareness of how students score on assessments good or bad? Obviously
one answer is that it depends on whether valid inferences are drawn from the data. One
part of the validity issue is whether the scores truly represent what students know and
can do. Another part of the validity issue is whether the public draws causative
inferences that are not supported by the data.
 In addition to the question of whether the inferences are valid, there is the issue of
how the public responds. Would negative news stimulate increased efforts by the public
to assist educators --e.g. by trying to ensure children start school ready to learn, by
providing better facilities, by insisting their children respect the teachers? Or would
negative news result in more rhetoric regarding how bad public schools are, how bad the
teachers are, and how we should give up on them and increase funding to private schools
at the expense of funding public schools? Would positive news result in teachers
receiving public accolades and more respect or would the public then place public
education on a back burner -- because the "crisis" was over?
 While I come down on the side of giving the public data about student
achievements, the communication with the public must be done with great care. I believe
there is a propensity for the public (at least the press) to engage in inappropriate blaming
of educators when student achievement is not as high as desired. I am reminded of
Browder's (1971) suggestion that accountability boils down to who gets hanged when
things go wrong and who does the hanging. Educators have good reason to believe that
they are the ones who will get hanged and the public, abetted by the press, will do the
hanging.
 Dorn has stated that "test results have become the dominant way states,
politicians, and newspapers describe the performance of schools." (1998, p. 2). He was
not suggesting that was a positive happening.
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V. WHAT VARIABLES CHANGE PROBABILITIES FOR GOOD
OR BAD IMPACTS
 Since whether consequences are good or bad is partly a matter of one's educational
values, it is difficult to answer this question. Nevertheless, I will provide a few
comments.
A. Impact should be (and likely is) related to purposes.
 As has been mentioned, there are two major purposes of large scale assessments:
to drive reform, and to see if reform practices have had an impact on student learning.
These are somewhat contradictory purposes, because current reformers believe
assessment should be "authentic" if it is to drive reform and most authentic assessment is
not very good measurement -- at least by any conventional measurement criteria.
B. Impact (and purposes) are likely related to test content, and the
public involvement in determining content and content standards.
Successful assessment reform needs to be an open and inclusive process, supported
by a broad range of policy makers, educators, and the public, and closely tied to
standards in which parents and the community have confidence. (The CRESST Line,
1997, p. 6).
The impact is not likely to be positive in any overall sense if the public has not bought
into the content standards that are being assessed.
 One can also expect some problems if the content and test standards are set too
high. The politically correct rhetoric that "all children can learn to high levels" has yet to
be demonstrated as correct. Recall the quote by Coffman given earlier. Recall also
Bracey's article entitled: Variance happens--get over it. Or, as a colleague once said,
would we require the PE instructor to get all students up to a level where they are
playing on the varsity team?
C. Impact may be related to item or test format.
 If the issue is whether the overall impact is good or bad, there is not much
evidence that item or test format matters. The abstract notion that teaching to improve
performance assessment results means educators will be teaching like they should be
teaching whereas teaching to improve multiple-choice test scores means teaching is of
poor quality is just nonsense.
D. Impact may be related to the quality of the assessment (perceived or
real) and the assessment procedures (e.g. test security and reporting
practices).
 If educators do not believe the assessments provide high quality data, they may
not pay much attention to them. Cunningham made this point very forcefully in
discussing the Kentucky Instructional Results Information System (KIRIS) program:
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As teachers begin to realize that the test has no legitimacy and that it is too
technically deficient to be influenced by how they teach, they will stop paying
attention to it. ... Measurement driven instruction does not work when teachers fail to
see the connection between measurement and instruction. (Cunningham, no date, p.
2).
 Whatever one believes about the technical adequacy of KIRIS, Cunningham's
general point would seem accurate: If teachers do not see any connection between the
assessment results and their instructional approaches the measurement is unlikely to
impact instruction.
 Another example comes from a paper Smith et al. (1997) wrote on the
consequences of the Arizona Student Assessment Program (ASAP). Some teachers
believed that the ASAP skills were not developmentally appropriate (p. 38), some
objected to what they perceived as poor-quality rubrics and to the subjectivity of the
scoring process (p. 39), some thought ASAP was just a fad and one teacher referred to
ASAP as Another Stupid Aggravating Program (p. 43). Again, the point is not whether
the teachers' perceptions were correct. But if they perceive the assessment quality to be
poor, they are not likely to be very positively impacted by it.
E. Impact may depend upon degree of sanctions.
 Some limited research evidence regarding this variable comes from a McDonnell
and Choisser (1997) study. They investigated the local implementation of state
assessments in North Carolina and Kentucky. As they suggested, Kentucky's program
involved high stakes for schools and educators, with major consequences attached to the
test results. The North Carolina assessment had no tangible consequences attached to it.
However
teachers in the two state samples perceive the new assessments in much the same
way and take them equally seriously. With few exceptions, their teaching reflects the
assessment policy goals of their respective states to a similar degree. (McDonnell
and Choisser, 1997, p. ix).
 Of course, the North Carolina assessments have some consequences. Results are
presented in district 'report cards' and in school building improvement results. And, at
the time the study was conducted, McDonnell and Choisser reported that
probably the most potent leverage the assessment system has over the behavior of
teachers is the widespread perception that local newspapers plan to report test scores
not just by individual school, which has been done traditionally, but also by specific
grade level and even by classroom (1997, p. 16).
One can imagine why teachers in North Carolina might think the stakes were fairly high
in spite of no state financial rewards or sanctions.
 Thus, in spite of the evidence which shows no distinctions between Kentucky,
which used financial rewards, and North Carolina, which simply made the scores
available, the perceived stakes to the teachers may not have been much different. I
continue to believe that as stakes increase, dissatisfaction increases, fear increases,
cheating increases, and lawsuits increase. However, efforts may also increase to improve
scores and, if the procedures are set up to make it difficult to improve scores without
improving competence on the domain, student learning should increase also.
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F. Impact may relate to level of professional development.
 Unfortunately, many current reform policies concentrate more on standards and
assessments than they do the professional development of teachers. In the Arizona SAP
program for example, only 19% of the teacher felt that adequate professional
development had been provided (Smith et al., 1997). Combs, in his critique of top-down
reform mandates stated that: "Things don't change people; people change things."
(quoted from Smith et al., 1997, p.50). As Smith et al. pointed out in their review, Cohen
(1995, p. 13) had noted the apparent anomaly in the systemic reform movement and
accountability intentions. Motivated by perceptions that public schools are failing,
advocates of systemic reform propose to radically change instruction, and for that
they must rely on teachers and administrators. But these agents of change are the
very professionals whose work reformers find so inadequate. (Quoted from Smith et
al., 1997, p. 105).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
 So, what can we conclude about the consequences of assessment? I list a dozen.
A. Purposes and Expectations
1. There are a variety of purposes for and expectations 
regarding the consequences of assessment. Some of these may
be unrealistic. "Evaluation and testing have become the engine 
for implementing educational policy" (Petrie, 1987, p. 175).
B. Need for Evidence
2. Scholars seem to agree that it is unwise, illogical, and 
unscholarly to just assume that assessments will have positive
consequences. There is the potential for both positive
consequences and negative consequences.
C. Quantity and Quality of the Evidence
3. It would profit us to have more research.
4. The evidence we do have is inadequate with respect to
drawing any cause/effect conclusions about the consequences.
If instruction changes concomitant with changes in both state
curricular guidelines and state assessments, how much of the
change was due to which variable?
D. Evaluating the Evidence
5. Not everyone will view changes (e.g. reforming curriculum 
in a particular way) with the same affect. Some will think the
changes represent positive consequences and others will think
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the changes constitute negative consequences.
E. Curricular and Instructional Consequences
6. High stakes assessments probably do impact both curriculum 
and instruction, but assessments alone are not likely as effective
as they would be if there were more teacher professional
development.
7. Attempts to reform curriculum in ways neither front line 
teachers nor the public support seems unwise.
F. Impact on Teachers
8. High stakes assessments increase teacher stress and lower 
teacher morale. This seems unfortunate to me, but may make
others happy.
9. Assessments can assist both students and teachers in 
evaluating whether the students are achieving at a sufficiently
high level. This seems like useful knowledge.
G. Impact on Test Scores and Student Learning
10. High stakes assessments will result in higher test scores.
Both test security and the opportunity to misadminister or
mis-score tests must be considered in evaluating whether higher
scores represent increased knowledge. If the test items are
secure (and reused items are not memorable), and if tests are
administered and scored correctly, it seems reasonably to infer
that higher scores indicate increased achievement in the
particular domain the assessment covers. That is good if the
domain represents important content and if teaching to that
domain does not result in ignoring other equally important 
domains. If tests are not secure, or are incorrectly administered
or scored, there is no reason to believe that higher scores
represent increased learning.
H. Impact on Public
11. The public and the press are more likely to use what they 
believe to be "inadequate" assessment results to blame
educators than to use "good" results to praise them. They will
continue to make inappropriate causative inferences from the
data. The public will not be impressed by assessments over
reform curricula they consider irrelevant.
I. Confounding Format, Content and Stakes in Considering
Consequences
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12. There has been a great deal of confounding of item format, 
test content and the stakes. Which format is used probably
makes far less difference than how it is used.
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Notes
This paper is a slight revision of the 1998 Vice Presidential address for Division
D, American Educational Research Association, presented in San Diego. I would
like to thank Bob Floden and Joe Ryan for helpful comments on a previous draft
of this paper. Opinions expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those
of the two reviewers.
1.
As Jones has wondered "Can he really mean that?" (Jones, 1997, p. 3).2.
Space does not permit me to do justice to this very thorough report. I urge readers
to obtain the report and study it carefully. Most of these state assessments equate
through anchor items, and these items may not be totally secure.
3.
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